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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the incentives facing candidates in the spatial
voting model. We assume that voters' types are independent, but allow for
nonidentical distributions across voters. Examining candidate positional equi-
libria as a function of voter behavior, we nd that what we term p-symmetric
strict p-local equilibria when candidates maximize expected plurality are also
strict p-local equilibris when candidates maximize probability of victory. This
result holds for arbitrary numbers of candidates and voters. We also show
that, for generic type distributions, interior p-asymmetric equilibria under
maximization of expected vote share are not equilibria under maximization
of probability of victory.
1 Introduction
The question, \What are political candidates' goals?" is an inherently empirical concern.
However, the question's importance is a theoretical matter. Politicians may have any of
several objectives when running for elected oce, but which one characterizes reality is an
important matter only if the dierent objectives lead to dierent behaviors in equilibrium.
Unfortunately, this is the case. This paper examines two such objective functions which
have been used in the theoretical literature on voting over the previous 50 years: expected
vote share and probability of victory. Our main question is straight-forward. When are
these objective functions equivalent? That is to say, when are predictions generated by
examination of one of these objective functions valid for the other?
Several authors have written on this question. Aranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook [1]
examine several candidate objective functions. The results they obtain are far from
heartening. In particular, the authors generally nd no powerful equivalence results.
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Hinich [6] states a claim that, in 2 candidate elections without abstention, expected vote
share and probability of victory yield identical best response functions. Ledyard [9] makes
a similar claim for two candidate elections with abstention. Ledyard's claim was argued
at the limit, and thus it is not clear that it is true. Finally, Patty [12] examines both
Hinich's and Ledyard's claims and proves that the best response functions generated
by expected plurality, expected vote share, and probability of victory are identical in
two candidate elections, with or without abstention, with arbitrary numbers of voters.
However, Patty assumes that voters' types are independently and identically distributed
across voters and provides an example with two candidates showing that best response
equivalence does not hold with nonidentically distributed voter types.
In this paper, we extend the study of candidate objective functions to the question
of equilibrium equivalence. Best response equivalence is essentially a decision-theoretic
concern, as it is dened to hold regardless of the opponents' strategies. Equilibrium
equivalence, on the other hand, is a game-theoretic concern. Two objective functions are
said to be equilibrium equivalent if the sets of Nash equilibria under the two objective
functions are identical. In order to study probabilistic voting models in as general a
fashion as possible, we characterize candidate positions by the resulting voter behavior
rather than by a specic policy space. Thus, one may consider our method as examining
a game in which candidates are taking the voter behavior as given (i.e. they are backward
inducing along the extensive form game tree).
We prove our results in what we term p-space, theN -fold Cartesian product of the vot-
ers' J-dimensional simplexes. It is with respect to this space that we dene p-symmetry,
which essentially amounts to all voters mixing with equal probability between each of the
J candidates. By examining the game in p-space, we are able to provide results which
apply to a very general class of probabilistic voting models. In addition, the notion of
p-neighborhoods is a weaker version of locality than neighborhoods in a policy space
whenever the average behavior of each voter is a continuous function of the policies pro-
posed by each candidate. This type of continuity generally holds in most probabilistic
voting models in the literature. Nevertheless, we do not impose any such restriction.
An additional advantage of our framework is that our results can be applied to either
traditional probabilistic models of choice (see, for example, Luce [10] or Coughlin [2])or
models of incomplete information in which voters optimally choose based on privately
known preferences (see, for example, Ledyard [9] or McKelvey and Patty [11]).
Our rst result is that p-symmetric strict p-local equilibria under maximization of
expected plurality and maximization of probability of victory are identical whenever
voters' types are independently distributed. In addition, we prove that, asymmetric
interior critical points generically do not coincide under the two objective functions.
That is, an asymmetric interior equilibrium under one objective function is generically
not an equilibrium under the other objective function.
These results are motivated by the results of several previous papers in probabilistic
voting models of candidate competition. For instance, Coughlin and Nitzan [3], [4] exam-
2
ine local Nash equilibria for two candidate elections under a probabilistic voting model.
Similarly, McKelvey and Patty [11] examine a model of strategic probabilistic voting with
an arbitrary number of candidates seeking to maximize expected margin of victory. They
prove the existence of a p-symmetric strict Nash equilibrium at the point that maximizes
the sum of the voters' utility functions whenever the number of voters is large enough.
Our rst result, Theorem 4, implies that the p-symmetric equilibrium characterized by
McKelvey and Patty is also an equilibrium under maximization of probability of victory.
McKelvey and Patty show that the point which maximizes the sum of voters' utilities
is a local equilibrium which \becomes" global as the number of voters grows without
bound. The logic is that voters become approximately indierent to the policies chosen
by the candidates, implying that candidates are not able to alter the strategies of the
voters very much when the number of voters is large. In addition, McKelvey and Patty
show that this form of asymptotic indierence will occur in a large class of probabilistic
voting models. Thus, the applications of p-local equilibria may be more general than
appears at rst glance.
2 The Model
Let J , with jJ j = J , denote the set of candidates and N , with jN j = N , denote the set
of voters. Each candidate simultaneously chooses a point in some policy space X. We
denote the space of all J-dimensional vectors of policy proposals by Y .
We will write the action of voter i, given y 2 Y , as s
i
= 
i
(y), and denote the number
of votes received by candidate j by v
j
= jfi 2 Njs
i
= jgj. We will write s for the vector
of s
i
for all voters i. We will denote the probability that voter i votes for candidate j at
y 2 Y by p
ij
(y) and the vector of all p
ij
(y), for some candidate j and all voters i, by p
j
(y).
We make no assumptions concerning p
i
except that it maps Y into the J-dimensional
simplex. We will say that p represents a voting strategy prole.
For any s 2 S, let W (s) 2 fj 2 J jv
j
 max
l2J
v
l
g denote the winning candidate at
s. In the case of a tie, W (s) is assumed to be determined by a fair lottery between all
eligible candidates.
1
When considering the probability of victory, let k

J
denote the minimum number of
votes with which a candidate can tie for victory.
2
For any x 2 Y , let G
j
(i; y) denote the
probability candidate j wins, conditional on voter i voting for j (s
i
= j) and let H
j
(i; x)
denote the conditional probability that candidate j wins, conditional on s
i
6= j.
1
That is, we will reduce the cases of ties into sets of winners. This is possible because we assume
that any tie-breaking lottery is fair, and hence independent of the identities of the candidates tied for
victory.
2
This number is of course well-dened and equal to the smallest integer greater than or equal to
N
K
.
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3 Equilibrium
We use the notation from Section 2 to express the probability of victory for candidate j,
given a candidate strategy prole x, as a sum over the voters. This sum is given in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 Given a policy prole, y 2 Y , the probability of victory by candidate j is given
by
R
j
(x) =
1
N
N
X
i
[p
ij
(x)G
j
(i; x) + (1  p
ij
(x))H
j
(i; x)]: (3.1)
Proof : Consider any voter i and any candidate j. From the denition of conditional
probabilities and the assumption of independence,
R
j
(x) = Pr[s
i
= j \ W (s) = j] + Pr[s
i
6= j \ W (s) = j]
= Pr[s
i
= j] Pr[W (s) = jjs
i
= j] + Pr[s
i
6= j] Pr[W (s) = jjs
i
6= j]
= p
ij
G
j
(i; x) + (1  p
ij
)H
j
(i; x):
The result then follows immediately by summing over i.
We now dene p-symmetry and p-locality.
Denition 2 Given a voting strategy prole represented by p, a policy prole y 2 Y is
p-symmetric if, for all i 2 N and all j; k 2 J,
p
ij
(y) = p
ik
(y):
Any policy prole which is not p-symmetric is referred to as p-asymmetric.
Denition 3 For some real number ", two policy proles, x; y 2 Y , are "-p-local if, for
each i 2 N and each j 2 J , jp
ij
(x)  p
ij
(y)j < ".
Let U denote a vector of payo functions in the candidate game, let x 2 Y be a
candidate policy prole, and let x
0
j
be any unilateral deviation by candidate j from x.
Then x is a strict p-local equilibrium under U if there exists "

> 0 satisfying the following.
For all j 2 J and for all x
0
j
which are "

-p-local to x,
U
j
(x) < U
j
(x
0
j
:
We can now prove our main result. A p-symmetric strategy prole by the candidates
is a strict p-local equilibrium under maximization of expected vote share if and only if it
is a strict p-local equilibrium under maximization of probability of victory.
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Theorem 4 An interior p-symmetric strategy prole x

is a strict p-local equilibrium
under maximization of expected vote share if and only if x

is a strict p-local equilibrium
under probability of victory maximization.
Proof : ()) Suppose that x

is an interior p-symmetric strategy prole for the candidates
such that x

is a strict p-local Nash equilibrium given maximization of expected vote
share. That is, given x
 j
, each candidate j is maximizing
1
N
N
X
i=1
p
ij
(x): (3.2)
Now consider the probability of victory for any candidate j. Note that G
j
(i; x

) =
G
k
(l; x

) for all i; l 2 N and j; k 2 J at any p-symmetric candidate strategy prole x

.
Then
R
j
(x) =
1
N
N
X
i
[p
ij
(x)G
j
(i; x) + (1  p
ij
(x))H
j
(i; x)]:
We prove the result by showing that there exists no p-local unilateral deviation in
p that increases a candidate's probability of victory. We argue using a Taylor series
approach. Taking rst derivatives of R
j
(x), we obtain
@R
j
@p
ij
(x)
=
1
N
"
G
j
(i; x) +H
j
(i; x) +
X
k 6=i
p
kj
(x)
@G
j
(k; x)
@p
ij
(x)
+ (1  p
kj
(x))
@H
j
(k; x)
@p
ij
(x)
#
:
(3.3)
Notice that the rst term on the RHS of Equation (3.3) is weakly greater than zero
because it is simply a conditional probability. The second term on the RHS of Equation
(3.3) is strictly greater than zero as well. This follows because we can express G
j
(k; x)
as the following for any i 6= k:
G
j
(k; x) = p
ij
Prfs 2 Sjj 2 W (s); s
i
= s
k
= jg
+(1  p
ij
) Prfs 2 Sjj 2 W (s); s
k
= j; s
i
6= jg: (3.4)
Note that for all s 2 S, simple plurality rule implies that
(j 2 W (s); s
k
= j; s
i
6= j)) (j 2 W (s); s
k
= s
i
= j);
which implies that
Prfv 2 V jj 2 W (s); s
k
= s
i
= jg > Prfv 2 V jj 2 W (s); s
k
= j; s
i
6= jg;
and since
@G
j
(k; x)
@p
ij
= Prfs 2 Sjj 2 W (s); s
k
= s
i
= jg   Prfs 2 Sjj 2 W (s)s
k
= j; s
i
6= jg;
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then
@G
j
(k; x)
@p
ij
> 0
for all i; j; k, and x. Similar logic applies for the partial derivatives of H
j
(i; x), for all i; j,
and x.
3
Evaluating the rst order Taylor series approximation of R
j
(x) at x

,
R
j
(x)  R
j
(x

) +rR
j
(x

)
T
 (p
j
(x)  p

j
);
where p

j
= (
1
J
; : : : ;
1
J
). By the fact that x

is a strict p-local Nash equilibrium under
maximization of expected vote share and continuity of p
ij
(x) for all i; j, and x, there
exists a neighborhood B(x

) such that for all x 2 B(x

), (p
j
(x)   p

j
)  1 < 0, where
1 represents a column vector of 1s. Finally, it follows from the p-symmetry of x

that
rR
j
(x

) is a scalar multiple of 1. Therefore, for all x 2 B(x

),
R
j
(x)  R
j
(x

) < 0;
which implies that a p-local unilateral deviation by one candidate from x

strictly de-
creases her payo. It follows, then, that if x

is a p-symmetric strict p-local Nash equi-
librium under maximization of expected vote, then x

is also a p-symmetric strict p-local
Nash equilibrium under maximization of probability of victory. The converse follows
similarly.
Theorem 5 Let x 2 Int(X) be an asymmetric Nash equilibrium under maximization
of expected vote share. Then, the set of type distributions, F , for which x is a Nash
equilibrium under maximization of probability of victory possesses Lebesgue measure zero.
Proof : In order to establish the theorem, it is sucient to prove that, for any direction
! 2 X, satisfaction of the rst order conditions for Nash equilibrium under expected vote
share imply that the rst order conditions for Nash equilibrium under maximization of
probability of victory generically do not hold.
Let x be an asymmetric Nash equilibrium under maximization of expected vote and
let D denote the space of possible p. Note that, for nite N , D is compact and convex.
Now choose, for each j 2 J , any vector dp(j; x) such that
N
X
i=1
@p
i
(j; x)
@
= 0; (3.5)
such that, for each j 2 J , there exists some i 2 N such that
@p
i
(j;x)
@
6= 0, and for all
j 2 J ,
J
X
j=1
@p
i
(j; x)
@
= 0: (3.6)
3
To see this, simply replace s
k
= j with s
k
6= j in the above argument.
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These are simply the rst order conditions for a Nash equilibrium under maximization of
expected vote share, a condition restricting our attention to non-i:i:d: type distributions,
and the requirement that
P
J
j=1
p
i
(j; x) = 1 for all i 2 N and x 2 X.
The rst order conditions for a Nash equilibrium under maximization of probability
of victory are simply
@R
j
@p

@p
@

=0
= 0: (3.7)
By equation 3.5, the space of
@R
j
@p
satisfying equation 3.7 is spanned by an N   1
dimensional subspace of D.
4
However, the range of
@R
j
@p
: D ! [0; 1]
N
is N -dimensional.
Thus, the dimensionality of the space of solutions is strictly less than that of the space
of possible vectors. It follows that the set of vectors satisfying equation 3.7 possesses
Lebesgue measure zero.
4 Extensions and Examples
In this section we discuss the tightness of our assumptions. That is, how much more can
we obtain beyond Theorem 4? We discuss the possibility of a general equivalence result
in some detail, and touch upon several other possible extensions to our results, including
global equilibrium results and relaxing the assumption of independence.
4.1 Best Response Equivalence
One might hope for a general equivalence result, a result which states that, in elections
with arbitrary numbers of candidates and independent voter types, the best response
functions generated by maximization of expected vote share and maximization of prob-
ability of victory are identical. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Indeed, it is not even
the case that such equivalence is obtained asymptotically. This is shown in Patty [12]
through a replicated three voter example. An open question is the following, however. Is
there any objective function which is computationally simpler than probability of victory
which yields an equivalent best response function?
4.2 Other Directions
There are several other directions in which our results might be extended. First among
these are the question of equivalence among global Nash equilibria under the two objective
functions and the relaxation of the independence assumption.
4
That is, given that Equations 3.7 and 3.5 are simultaneously satised, (p
1
; : : : ; p
N 1
) uniquely
determine p
N
.
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Theorem 4 gives sucient conditions only for p-local equilibria. The proof of Theorem
4 does not examine boundary conditions or second-order conditions. It turns out that
in many settings the maximum probability of victory for a candidate k does not fall in
the interior of the N -fold product of J   1-dimensional simplices (i.e. the p-space). As
Patty [12] points out, this leads to the failure of general best response equivalence when
voters' types are nonidentically distributed.
Another obvious extension of our results would allow for type distributions in which
the realizations of voter types exhibit dependence across voters. The arguments for
Theorem 4 do not neccessarily work in such environments for several reasons. The rst
of these is that we are no longer assured that G
j
and H
j
are nonnegative functions (in
the usual vector sense of nonnegativity). This is because the vote of one voter may aect
the vote of another, so that increasing one voter's probability of voting for candidate
j may decrease another voter's probability of voting for j. The second reason is that
the notion of p-locality becomes less sensible in such an environment. In particular, p-
locality is dened with respect to rectangles in p-space. Such a denition of locality is
not necessarily the most appropriate denition when independence fails to hold. Simply
put, a failure of independence may imply that R
j
(p) is no longer linear with respect to
each p
ij
.
On a positive note, however, the basic conclusion of Theorem 4 should continue to
hold even in the absence of independence. The logic is that independence encompasses
every possible vector of p
ij
for any candidate j. Thus, so long as individual behavior
can be characterized as multinomial processes of some type, Theorem 4 should remain
true. The major diculty is that it may mean nothing without imposing some sort of
additional structure on the nature of the dependence (such as the measure of vectors
of votes cast is absolutely continuous with respect to the product measure of votes cast
by each voter), as the set of policy proles which are p-local to any p-symmetric policy
prole may indeed be empty.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided general p-local equilibrium equivalence results for dierent
candidate objectives in probabilistic voting models with independently distributed voter
types. Our rst result, Theorem 4, states that p-symmetric strict p-local equilibria are
equivalent under the two objective functions, regardless of the number of candidates. The
second result, Theorem 5, states that asymmetric equilibria are generically not equivalent
under the objective functions. That is, with near certainty, a p-asymmetric equilibrium
under one objective function is not an equilibrium under the other. That this applies
to two candidate contests may be somewhat surprising, but recall that our denition of
p-symmetry may be satised by candidate strategy proles which are asymmetric with
respect to candidate actions.
This result implies that the equilibrium found in McKelvey and Patty [11], for in-
8
stance, is invariant to the authors' choice of objective functions. This follows because
McKelvey and Patty show that, as the number of voters increases, the amount any can-
didate can change any given voters' likelihood of voting for him or her vanishes. Hence,
the neighborhood of potential p vectors available to any candidate is shrinking, such that
eventually the p-symmetric strict local equilibrium becomes a global equilibrium.
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